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REVIEW ESSAYS
A QUESTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
Robert L. Gallucci
Lodal, Jan. The Price of Dominance: The New Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Their Challenge to American Leadership. New
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001. 234pp. $19.95
Quester, George H. Nuclear Monopoly. New Brunswick, N.J.:
Transaction, Rutgers Univ., 2000. 234pp. $44.95
Both books are about America’s strategic nuclear weapons policy. Jan Lodal, au-
thor of The Price of Dominance, knows a lot about the subject from having
helped make nuclear weapons policy in both the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford
administrations, and at the Pentagon during the Jimmy Carter administration.
George Quester, author of Nuclear Monopoly, is also an expert, having written
important books about nuclear strategy and nuclear proliferation for more than
three decades. Lodal analyzes the current U.S. strate-
gic posture and, finding it wanting, advocates a
change in policy. Quester analyzes that brief period in
America’s past when it was the only nation with nu-
clear weapons, and asks why U.S. policy was not then
different from what it was, and what lessons might
be learned for future policy. These are very different
books, from authors with quite different experiences,
but both speak to America’s unique position of power
in the world and what the United States might do with
that power.
Lodal begins by identifying the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as the most
immediate serious threat to the security of the United
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States. He then asserts that “intense international cooperation” will be essential
if the United States is to deal with that threat but that America’s overwhelming
nuclear power and the current direction of policy undermine cooperation.
Thus, the price of America’s strategic nuclear dominance will be increased vul-
nerability to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons in the hands of many
states.
There is an assertion here of a direct link between the U.S. strategic nuclear
weapons posture and its nonproliferation efforts; Lodal finds the strategic vi-
sion that should constructively connect the two to be absent or confused. Spe-
cifically, he sees recent U.S. policy as informed by a muddle of three visions: one
that would require more of the same kind of negotiated arms control that
the United States has been pursuing for decades; one that would replace arms
control with a robust missile defense; and a third that would move the United
States to the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction. The first he describes
as stalled, caught in gridlock without the cooperation from other countries nec-
essary if it is to succeed; the second he pronounces technically impossible to
achieve; and the third he easily puts aside as politically implausible. The way
then is clear for Lodal’s new strategic vision of deterrence and cooperation, the
central features of which are a strategic force of a thousand nuclear weapons de-
ployed aboard B-2 bombers and submarines, plus an additional two hundred
weapons in Europe to maintain “coupling” with Nato, and a “thin” missile de-
fense of one hundred interceptors, with deployments in space limited to sensors
for warning and tracking.
This prescription follows from the view that America must avoid adopting a
force posture with the combination of offensive strategic nuclear forces and a
robust missile defense that would imply overwhelming dominance. Lodal notes
that current strategic nuclear-strike plans call for the United States to maintain a
capability to respond to the warning of an attack with the prompt launch of a
counterstrike at an enemy’s forces to reduce the amount of damage suffered and
to ensure that U.S. forces are used before they are destroyed. However, this re-
quirement, he says, is a fiction because of the short time available to make such a
decision to “launch on warning.” The capability to attack promptly and destroy
an enemy’s forces is really a preemptive capability. Moreover, if present U.S. of-
fensive forces are maintained or reduced to a level no lower than 2,500 weapons,
and if even a “thin” missile defense is deployed, America would appear to have a
first-strike capability—the ability to launch preemptively a disarming strike
against any combination of enemies and deter retaliation by a combination of
retained offense and deployed defense.
Before this begins to sound too appealing, we are reminded that the United
States should not want this strategic dominance, because of what it would cost
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in other nations’ willingness to cooperate with American efforts to control
WMD—the real threat to U.S. security. There are other benefits to Lodal’s
slimmed-down, purely deterrent strategic posture besides avoiding an alienat-
ing dominance. First, mutual de-alerting of offensive forces becomes possible,
since all U.S. forces are survivable and have no prompt-response mission. Sec-
ond, the thin defense would be available to cope with accidents, unintended
launches, and irrational rogues, and to improve crisis stability by forcing an en-
emy to launch, or threaten to launch, a significant strategic attack if it sought to
prevail by escalation or intimidation.
There is much to recommend Lodal’s prescription but less reason to believe
it will be embraced. While he is surely right about the emerging American
first-strike capability if U.S. offensive forces are not drastically reduced as a na-
tional missile defense is deployed, there is no reason to believe that the Bush ad-
ministration (or any other administration, for that matter) would assess the
price of such dominance the way Lodal does or decide not to pay it. But Lodal’s
discussion of this central argument is the best part of the book. It is stronger
than his brief treatment of the complex issues of regional WMD proliferation,
and it deserves careful reading and serious discussion.
Quester’s critique of U.S. nuclear policy addresses the period beginning in
1945, when the United States built its first nuclear weapons, and ending in 1949,
when it was sure the Soviet Union had done the same. The author finds it fasci-
nating that a nation that had just emerged from a world war with a monopoly
(which it could be sure would not last long) on nuclear weapons did not do
something to keep its advantage and thus avoid a foreseeable eternity of vulnera-
bility and dependence on deterrence.
The reader, of course, initially may not find the point nearly as fascinating as
Quester, believing instead that launching a nuclear attack against the Soviet
Union’s nascent nuclear facilities and cities—that is, “using” its monopoly to
start a preventive war—was and is unthinkable in terms of American values. It is
precisely this attitude that troubles Quester. He argues at length that a number
of important thinkers in the United States and Britain considered “using” the
monopoly and that U.S. explanations for why Washington did not try harder to
preserve its position of dominance are not all that persuasive. As the author puts
it, this book is “all about” the idea of “imposing rather than proposing the
Baruch Plan.”
As it turns out, whether one finds the essential question as compelling a para-
dox as the author does is less important than the analysis and argument of the
case with all its variations. It is unfortunate, though, that with all the creative
rigor Quester brings to his discourse, he is not more careful to distinguish be-
tween the case for attempting compellance, intimidation, or just more assertive
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diplomacy predicated on a military posture of nuclear monopoly, on the one
hand, and the actual launch of a nuclear strike in a preventive war, on the other.
Too often the many uses of America’s nuclear monopoly are lumped together,
when clearly some are much more “thinkable” than others.
In sum, both these books should be read by strategists, military professionals,
and concerned citizens, because each speaks to the question of American nu-
clear dominance and how it ought to be used in the broader national interest.
Lodal’s book is clearly more sharply focused on current policy prescription, and
it is easier to find in this work propositions to embrace as well as those with
which to take issue. Quester’s book is a more enjoyable read, however, providing
at least as much to argue over, particularly for those who thrive on counterfactual
propositions.
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